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INTRODUCTION
In July 2014, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
interviewed a man named Omar Mateen about his connection
to a Florida native named Moner Mohammad Abusalha.1
Abusalha had killed himself two months earlier during a sui-
cide attack in Syria, during which he drove a truck full of
explosives into a restaurant.2  The group formerly known as
Jabhat al-Nusra claimed responsibility for the suicide attack
and credited Abusalha as the first U.S. citizen to carry out a
“martyrdom operation” on Syrian soil.3
The local Islamic community in Abusalha’s hometown of
Port St. Lucie, Florida struggled to reconcile how a “jovial and
easygoing” young man had become radicalized.4  Abusalha’s
initial radicalization had occurred in the United States prior to
his first trip to Syria in 2013, and there was a concern among
the community that its youth could be susceptible to the same
extremist tendencies—especially given that Abusalha had
made an apparent recruiting trip back to the United States
after his training in Syria.5  Mohammed Malik, a Pakistani-
1 Moner Mohammad Abusalha, COUNTER EXTREMISM PROJECT: TERRORISTS AND
EXTREMISTS DATABASE, http://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/moner-
mohammad-abusalha [https://perma.cc/K9RD-H9FA]; see James B. Comey,
Former Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Remarks at Press Briefing on Orlando
Mass Shooting, FBI Headquarters: Update on Orlando Terrorism Investigation
(June 13, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/update-on-orlando-terror
ism-investigation [https://perma.cc/JUJ4-YFCR].
2 Frances Robles & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Before Syrian Suicide Blast, a
Quiet Life in the Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/06/01/us/Moner-Mohammad-Abusalha-Vero-Beach-Florida-Syria.html
[https://perma.cc/GRE8-6JQZ].
3 Moner Mohammad Abusalha, supra note 1.  In July 2016, Jabhat al-Nursa R
formally split from al-Qaeda and renamed itself Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (“Front for
the Conquest of Syria”).  Shaul Shay & Ely Karmon, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham–Did
Jabhat al-Nusra Split from Al-Qaeda?, INT’L INST. FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM (Aug. 4,
2016), https://www.ict.org.il/Article/1751/jabhat-fateh-al-sham-did-jabhat-al-
nusra-split-from-al-qaeda [https://perma.cc/7MBK-JMPN].
4 Mohammed A. Malik, I Reported Omar Mateen to the FBI. Trump is Wrong




5 See Adam Goldman & Greg Miller, American Suicide Bomber’s Travels in
the U.S., Middle East Went Unmonitored, WASH. POST: NAT’L SECURITY (Oct. 11,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/american-sui
cide-bombers-travels-in-us-middle-east-went-unmonitored/2014/10/11/38a32
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American living in Port St. Lucie and a member of the local
Islamic community, took it upon himself to speak with the FBI
and other concerned community members in an effort to un-
derstand the motive behind Abusalha’s radicalization.6  One
such conversation occurred between Malik and Mateen, both of
whom had attended mosque at the Islamic Center of Fort Pierce
with Abusalha.7  During this conversation, Mateen told Malik
that, like Abusalha, he too had been watching videos depicting
the American-born-turned-al-Qaeda digital propagandist,
Anwar al-Awlaki.  Mateen told Malik that he found the videos
“very powerful,” a response that Malik found disturbing enough
to again contact the FBI.  The FBI, having already looked into
Mateen based on a tip received in 2013, investigated him for a
second time and once again deemed him not to be a threat.8
Less than two years later, Mateen opened fire on a night-
club in Orlando, killing forty-nine people and injuring fifty-
three in the “deadliest terror attack on American soil since 9/
11.”9  In the attack, Mateen used a Sig Sauer MCX assault rifle
28e-4fe8-11e4-aa5e-7153e466a02d_story.html [https://perma.cc/36SE-QESJ].
Although Abusalha was subject to additional screening and questioning at the
U.S. border, Abusalha entered the United States essentially unnoticed. See gen-
erally PETER BERGEN, COURTNEY SCHUSTER & DAVID STERMAN, NEW AM., ISIS IN THE
WEST: THE NEW FACES OF EXTREMISM 12 (2015), https://static.newamerica.org/
attachments/11813-isis-in-the-west-2/ISP-Isis-In-The-West-v2.b4f2e9e3a7c94b
9e9bd2a293bae2e759.pdf [https://perma.cc/48UP-QR82] (arguing that
Abusalha’s travel to the U.S. after training in Syria raises a “real concern regard-
ing existing security measures”).
6 See Malik, supra note 4; Morning Edition: A Muslim Reported Omar Mateen R
to the FBI Well Before Orlando Shooting, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 22, 2016), http://
www.npr.org/2016/06/22/483046567/a-muslim-reported-omar-mateen-to-
the-fbi-well-before-the-orlando-shooting [https://perma.cc/QKA5-B6ZF].
7 See Malik, supra note 4. R
8 The FBI first investigated Mateen in 2013 over a ten-month period in re-
sponse to coworkers reporting that he had told them he had connections to al-
Qaeda, was a member of Hezbollah, and wanted to be a martyr.  Comey, supra
note 1. R
9 Omar Mateen, COUNTER EXTREMISM PROJECT: TERRORISTS AND EXTREMISTS
DATABASE, http://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/omar-mateen [https:/
/perma.cc/C7BP-69YJ].  After this Note was submitted for publication, a shooting
occurred in Las Vegas where the number of casualties surpassed that of the
Orlando shooting, with early reports estimating 58 dead and over 500 injured.
Within a day of the shooting, ISIL claimed responsibility but the FBI announced
that their initial investigation of the incident suggested “no connection with an
international terrorist group.”  While the forthcoming investigation will clarify the
circumstances surrounding this shooting, this incident serves as another stark
reminder of the complexity of the relationship between gun rights and national
security law.  Bill Chappell, Las Vegas Shooting Update: At Least 58 People Are
Dead After Gunman Attacks Concert, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 2, 2017, 3:15 AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/10/02/554976369/section-of-
las-vegas-strip-is-closed-after-music-festival-shooting [https://perma.cc/KDC8-
XS9A]; see infra note 33. R
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and a Glock semiautomatic pistol—both of which he had le-
gally purchased about a week prior to the attack.10  A prime
example of “homegrown extremism,” Mateen had been operat-
ing in American society as a detected-yet-dismissed terrorist.11
After the FBI interviewed him in 2013 and again in 2014, he
had been placed in the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)
but was removed after the FBI conducted its investigation.12
Yet Mateen had a record of professing empathy toward the
jihadist cause.  He watched extremist videos, spoke to col-
leagues about his support for terrorist organizations, ran
searches on Facebook about past terrorist attacks, and was
influenced, either directly or indirectly, by the actions of
Abusalha.13  So how did an individual who had been, in retro-
spect, so inextricably entwined with terrorism fall through the
cracks?
There are undoubtedly holes in national security law.  In
fact, terrorism would not be such a considerable threat if there
were not gaps and vulnerabilities that terrorists could discover
and exploit.  This is simply the nature of the current “cat and
mouse” game.14  For national security officials, the goal is to
recognize and isolate the gaps, constrict them to create a tem-
porary solution, and then close them permanently.
One such gap is the loophole in U.S. law that allows indi-
viduals appearing in the TSDB to legally purchase firearms—
10 VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., UNDERSTANDING THE SIG SAUER MCX ASSAULT RIFLE
USED IN THE ORLANDO MASS SHOOTING 1 (2016), http://www.vpc.org/studies/Sig
%20Sauer%20Backgrounder.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R2A-2MUZ]; Bureau of Al-
cohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (@ATFHQ), TWITTER (June 12, 2016,
12:24 PM), https://twitter.com/ATFHQ/status/742075110161588224 [https://
perma.cc/2Y9G-GF92].
11 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President After Briefing on the
Attack in Orlando, Florida (June 13, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/13/remarks-president-after-briefing-at
tack-orlando-florida [https://perma.cc/95AD-WYV7].
12 Russell Berman, Could Congress Have Stopped Omar Mateen From Getting
His Guns?, ATLANTIC (June 14, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2016/06/closing-the-terror-gun-loophole-might-not-have-stopped-the-
orlando-massacre/486863/ [https://perma.cc/7GRC-3NRA]; see Comey, supra
note 1. R
13 See Comey, supra note 1; Facebook Asked to Provide Details of Gunman’s R
Postings, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016
/06/16/us/document-JohnsonFacebookletter-2.html [https://perma.cc/4J89-
X4CC]; Omar Mateen, supra note 9. R
14 See generally Bonnie Kristian, As ISIS Spreads, the U.S. Must Not Play Cat
and Mouse, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 12, 2016, 10:23 AM), http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/entry/as-isis-spreads-the-us-must-not-play-cat-and-mouse_us_
57addbc4e4b03d06fe8494b3 [https://perma.cc/JN53-336B] (arguing that the
United States, as the cat, should instead adopt a strategy of defense against ISIL,
the mouse).
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this is the “terror gap.”15  Certainly this gap has been recog-
nized and isolated: with the increasing threat of terrorism on
U.S. soil,16 as exemplified by the Orlando and San Bernardino
tragedies, Congress can agree that guns are too easily getting
into the hands of terrorists.17  Although there have been legis-
lative attempts to close the “terror gap,” no statutory remedy
has emerged that would successfully marry U.S. firearms regu-
lations with the terrorist watchlist system.18  Yet the lack of
coordination between the current gun background check sys-
tem and the terrorist watchlist system is allowing individuals,
like Omar Mateen, to slip through the system.  The United
States must find a permanent solution to fill the gap, one that
reduces the threat of gun-driven terrorism, adheres to the Sec-
ond Amendment guarantee for an individual’s right to bear
arms, and avoids the constitutional pitfalls all too common
when there is a tightening of national security laws.
In this Note, I will argue that closing the “terror gap” re-
quires a reexamination and modernization of the interaction
between the watchlist system and firearms regulations.  I will
suggest that direct statutory reform will fail, and I will offer a
solution to indirectly close the loophole that combines con-
struction of a modernized, refined watchlist system based on a
tier structure with a system of “sticks and carrots” on the state
and local level.  In Part I, I will provide the relevant background
information related to current terrorism statutes and defini-
tions, the watchlist system, and firearms regulations.  In Part
II, I will examine past and recent attempts at closing the loop-
hole, including Former President George W. Bush’s attempt
after 9/11, Senator Diane Feinstein’s (D-CA) amendment, Sen-
ator John Cornyn’s (R-TX) amendment, and Senator Susan
Collins’s (R-ME) bi-partisan approach.  I will explain why these
initiatives have not been successful.  Part III offers a new ap-
proach.  I will conclude by suggesting that whatever mecha-
nism is used to close the loophole should not be considered a
compromised or “second-best” solution.
15 Closing the Terror Gap, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY SUPPORT FUND (June 17,
2016), https://everytownresearch.org/documents/2015/12/closing-terror-gap
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HEQ-B7SY]; see Berman, supra note 12. R
16 See, e.g., Lilly Chapa, Domestic Terrorism Is on the Rise, ASIS INT’L: SECUR-
ITY MGMT. (Dec. 4, 2015), https://sm.asisonline.org/Pages/Uprooting-Home
grown-Terror.aspx [https://perma.cc/U73D-MXDR] (arguing that individuals
who have no connection to terrorist groups are increasingly carrying out acts of
domestic terrorism).
17 For a discussion of what constitutes “terrorism,” see infra note 33. R
18 See infra Part II.
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I
BACKGROUND: PUTTING THE “TERROR GAP” IN CONTEXT
A. Terrorism: Acts, Statutes, and Current Trends
The attacks of September 11, 2001, required the U.S. gov-
ernment to fundamentally reexamine the nature of terrorism
and the scope of national security law.19  Whereas the pre-9/11
U.S. national security doctrine defined the majority of threats
as originating along geographic lines, the main threat to the
United States after 9/11 emerged along transnational societal
factions built around community cornerstones such as relig-
ion, ethnicity, race, politics, and general ideology.20  Sixteen
years after 9/11, terrorism continues to evolve.  The current
terrorist threat is “broader, wider, and deeper,” with groups like
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)21 using a harrow-
ing variety of tactics to target and successfully execute attacks
around the world.22  The breadth and scope of ISIL and its
associated groups is markedly different from the days of
Osama Bin Laden and core al-Qaeda,23 and there are “more
threats originating in more places and involving more individu-
als than . . . at any time in the past 15 years.”24  Today, home-
grown violent extremists (HVEs) pose a particularly unique
challenge to counterterrorism efforts as they are, by nature,
difficult to identify.  In many ways, the legislative counterter-
rorism initiatives adopted and modified since 9/11 have failed
to keep pace with the unpredictable nature of the threat land-
scape.  In this Section, I will discuss the evolving history of
terrorism legislation, introduce the applicable terrorism prose-
cution statutes, and examine the current trends of HVE
development.
19 NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
UNITED STATES 361 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
20 See id. at 361–62.
21 ISIL is also known as the Islamic State, ISIS, IS, or Daesh.  For consistency,
I will refer to the group as ISIL in this Note.
22 See Fifteen Years After 9/11: Threats to the Homeland: Hearing Before the
S. Homeland Sec. Governmental Affairs Comm., 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of
Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center).
23 See Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different Goals, Different Targets: Pre-
pared Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the
H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 114th Cong. (2015) (prepared testimony of Daniel L.
Byman, Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution).
24 Rasmussen, supra note 22. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-1\CRN105.txt unknown Seq: 7 15-NOV-17 14:46
2017] BEWARE THE “TERROR GAP” 211
1. History of Terrorism Legislation Post-9/11: The USA
PATRIOT Act25
Prior to 9/11, Congress had done little to reorganize its
national security initiatives from a post-Cold War focus, and
there was no integrated approach to counterterrorism legisla-
tion or policy.26  As a result, Congress rushed to compose
counterterrorism legislation that conformed to many of the rec-
ommendations posed by the Executive Branch under the lead-
ership of President George W. Bush.27  Only six weeks after
9/11, Congress passed the “Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001” (better known as the “USA
PATRIOT Act” or “PATRIOT Act”).28  The PATRIOT Act provided
broad authority to the Executive Branch in an effort to
overcompensate for the dearth of intra- and interagency coordi-
nation prior to 9/11.29
The PATRIOT Act had immense and immediate practical
effects, two of which included redefining the scope of “terror-
ism” and expanding the government’s power of collection and
surveillance.30  In section 802 of the Act, Congress amended
the definition of “terrorism” falling under 18 U.S.C. § 2331 to
include “domestic terrorism.”31  This created a bright-line de-
lineation between what constitutes “international terrorism”
and “domestic terrorism,” with the primary difference being
whether the “acts dangerous to human life” occur outside or
25 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.).
26 See, e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 19, at 105 (noting that the R
House of Representatives had “at least 14 different committees” with some degree
of jurisdiction over terrorism-related issues).
27 See DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SAC-
RIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 195–96 (New Press 2006)
(1999).
28 Id. at 195; see generally Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, U.S. DEP’T
JUST.: PRESERVING LIFE AND LIBERTY, https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/high
lights.htm [https://perma.cc/7TPA-VMB7].
29 See generally COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 27, at 196–97 (noting that the R
post-9/11 intelligence community worked within an internal “cloak of secrecy”).
30 See, e.g., Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 28 (suggesting four R
ways in which the PATRIOT Act protects the general public from the threat of
terrorism while preserving their life and liberty interests).
31 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107–56, § 802 115 Stat. 272, 376 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.).
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within the “territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”32  Sub-
stantial criticism followed over the scope of these definitions,33
and organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union ar-
gued that the government could deem any group with a posi-
tion contrary to government policy as participating in
terrorism.34
This concern was compounded by criticisms over the scope
of power that the PATRIOT Act granted to the government,
particularly the Intelligence Community (IC), for collection and
surveillance.  Section 505 of the PATRIOT Act expanded the
power of the IC under 18 U.S.C. § 2709 to collect data from
32 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2012).  The statute defines “domestic terrorism” as activ-
ities that:
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be
intended— (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
The statute defines “international terrorism” as activities that:
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or
that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended—
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect
the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms
of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they
appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their
perpetrators operate or seek asylum . . . .
33 An important clarification is that 18 U.S.C. § 2331 “does not create a new
crime of domestic terrorism.” How the USA PATRIOT Act Redefines “Domestic
Terrorism,” AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/how-usa-patri
ot-act-redefines-domestic-terrorism [https://perma.cc/N9ZB-GAKH].  In other
words, § 2331 expands the scope of what constitutes “terrorism” by including a
definition of “domestic terrorism.” See id.  While the breadth of “terrorism” is
critical to understanding current U.S. counterterrorism policy, it is beyond the
scope of this Note to discuss whether the United States should create a separate
crime of “domestic terrorism.”
34 See, e.g., id. (arguing that the new definition under the PATRIOT Act would
even “encompass the activities of several prominent activist campaigns and orga-
nizations [such as] Greenpeace, Operation Rescue, Vieques Island and WTO
protesters and the Environmental Liberation Front”). But see Dispelling the
Myths, U.S. DEP’T JUST.: PRESERVING LIFE AND LIBERTY, https://www.justice.gov/
archive/ll/subs/u_myths.htm [https://perma.cc/2FSY-YYLV] (“The Patriot Act
limits domestic terrorism to conduct that breaks criminal laws, endangering
human life.  ‘Peaceful groups that dissent from government policy’ without break-
ing laws cannot be targeted.  Peaceful political discourse and dissent is one of
America’s most cherished freedoms, and is not subject to investigation as domes-
tic terrorism.”).
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U.S. citizens using “national security letters,” or NSLs, which
are demands from the IC that mandate the disclosure of large
amounts of data without requiring judicial approval.35  Addi-
tionally, section 215 of the Act created 50 U.S.C. § 1861, al-
lowing the FBI to seize “any tangible things (including books,
records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investiga-
tion to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities.”36  Although section 215 specifically did
not mention “domestic terrorism,” there was widespread criti-
cism that the Act created an incentive for the FBI to collect
information on individuals, including U.S. citizens, without es-
tablishing a “factual basis” or a “particular nexus between the
records sought and a suspected agent.”37  Critics voiced con-
cerns that this nearly unlimited IC discretion could lead to
racial and ethnic profiling.38  In fact, while U.S. officials and
counterparts openly disclaimed racial and ethnic profiling,
concrete examples emerged after 9/11, documenting intelli-
gence surveillance and collection efforts concentrated on Arab
and Muslim individuals purely because of their background.39
Despite these concerns (and realized consequences), sup-
porters of the PATRIOT Act saw loopholes in the pre-9/11 ter-
rorism statutes that posed an immediate threat to homeland
security and needed to be amended.  As then-Senator Joe
Biden (D-DE) said during a Senate debate on the PATRIOT Act,
“[I]t simply did not make sense that many of our law enforce-
ment tools were not available for terrorism cases. . . . [T]he FBI
could get a wiretap to investigate the mafia, but they could not
get one to investigate terrorists.  To put it bluntly, that was
crazy!  What’s good for the mob should be good for terrorists.”40
35 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 27, at 214. R
36 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.); 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012).
37 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 27, at 215; see also RONALD J. SIEVERT, DE- R
FENSE, LIBERTY, AND THE CONSTITUTION 75 (2005) (documenting the public’s “frenzy”
over the PATRIOT Act, based mostly on misconceptions).
38 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 27, at 221. R
39 See, e.g., THE MUSLIM AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES COAL. ET AL., MAPPING MUSLIMS:
NYPD SPYING AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN MUSLIMS 7–11 (2013) (detailing the New
York Police Department’s (NYPD) use of ethnic profiling in its operations, despite
an officer in the NYPD’s Intelligence Division saying, “I never made a lead from the
rhetoric that came from a Demographics report . . .”).
40 147 CONG. REC. S11,048 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Biden).
For other examples of responses from Congressional members regarding the PA-
TRIOT Act, see Congress Speaks, U.S. DEP’T JUST.: PRESERVING LIFE AND LIBERTY,
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/subs/q_support.htm [https://perma.cc/
4XKU-Z3Z8].
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Several sections of the PATRIOT Act were subject to expir-
ing sunset provisions in 2015.41  In June 2015, Congress
passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling
Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of
2015 (“USA FREEDOM Act” or “FREEDOM Act”) that reinstated
the core features of the PATRIOT Act but in a post-Edward
Snowden and Wikileaks framework.42  Among other changes,
the FREEDOM Act mandated new government reporting re-
quirements, prohibited bulk data collection and instated a “two
hop” structure for collection under section 215, and
reauthorized the “lone wolf” provision under section 6001(b) of
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(IRTPA) that was subject to the PATRIOT Act’s sunset provi-
sion.43  Ultimately, the PATRIOT Act’s legacy continues to pro-
vide broad, discretionary power to the IC in the realm of data
collection and surveillance, providing a legislative backdrop to
the terrorist watchlist system.44
2. Prosecution Under the Terrorism Statutes: 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2339A and 2339B45
Following 9/11, the U.S. government revitalized the use of
18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B for the prosecution of terrorists
41 See Conor Friedersdorf, Don’t Underestimate the National-Security State,
ATLANTIC (June 1, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/
dont-underestimate-the-national-security-state/394571 [https://perma.cc/
D92K-2Q2J] (“[S]unset is wholly inadequate as a substantive reform to surveil-
lance policy . . . .”).
42 Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Ef-
fective Discipline over Monitoring Act (USA FREEDOM Act) of 2015, Pub. L. No.
114–23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.); see also Raf Sanchez, Congress Passes First Major NSA Reforms since
Edward Snowden Leaks, TELEGRAPH (June 2, 2015, 10:52 PM), http://www.tele
graph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/11647583/Congress-passes-
first-major-NSA-reforms-since-Edward-Snowden-leaks.html [https://perma.cc/
U3LU-MUF8] (“All sides agreed that the [USA FREEDOM Act’s] passage was a
milestone in the debate over security and liberty that began with Snowden’s
release of thousands of classified NSA documents.”).
43 USA Freedom Act: What’s In, What’s Out, WASH. POST (June 2, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/usa-freedom-act [https://
perma.cc/TGD4-HQ3R]; Jodie Liu, So What Does the USA Freedom Act Do Any-
way?, LAWFARE (June 3, 2015, 5:29 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/so-what-
does-usa-freedom-act-do-anyway [https://perma.cc/YUV5-75WD].  The “lone
wolf” provision allowed tracking of persons with terrorist ties although they might
have no connection to a foreign government. See Michael J. Woods & Suzanne E.
Spaulding, Lone Wolf, PATRIOT DEBATES: A SOURCEBLOG FOR THE USA PATRIOT DE-
BATE, https://apps.americanbar.org/natsecurity/patriotdebates/lone-wolf
[https://perma.cc/X6VB-G34R].
44 See infra subpart I.B.
45 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2012).
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and sympathizers.46  Although these two “material support”
statutes are often considered offshoots of the PATRIOT Act,
they were originally adopted in the mid-1990s but had been
rarely used by federal prosecutors.  Congress originally enacted
§ 2339A as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994,47 an “omnibus crime bill” advocated by Pres-
ident Bill Clinton that critics claimed provided “money and
perverse incentives for law enforcement” to adopt “abusive”
practices.48  In 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, a “controversial” act better known
for its substantial impact on habeas corpus law than for its
granting of power to the Department of State to target foreign
terrorist organizations (FTOs) who pose a threat to U.S. secur-
ity and interests.49  This Act amended § 2339A to create a
larger list of terrorism-related offenses that would trigger “ma-
terial support” prosecution under the statute, and it disposed
of  “unworkable investigative restrictions” that were preventing
federal prosecutors from using the statute.50  The Act also cre-
ated § 2339B, which explicitly connected “material support” to
FTOs.
Both § 2339A and § 2339B have gone through several iter-
ations, with a general broadening of the scope of “material sup-
port” resulting in litigation in federal courts.51  After the
PATRIOT Act added “expert advice or assistance” to the defini-
tion of “material support,”52 the Humanitarian Law Project filed
suit in federal court.53  The Humanitarian Law Project, on be-
46 Alan F. Williams, Prosecuting Website Development Under the Material Sup-
port to Terrorism Statutes: Time to Fix What’s Broken, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y  365, 373 (2008).
47 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, § 120005, 108 Stat. 1796, 2022–23 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of the U.S.C.); Williams, supra note 46, at 373. R
48 13TH (Kandoo Films 2016).
49 See Lincoln Caplan, The Destruction of Defendants’ Rights, NEW YORKER
(June 21, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-destruction-
of-defendants-rights [https://perma.cc/F9BC-8B3J]; see also U.S. Attorneys’
Manual, Criminal Resource Manual Section 16: Providing Material Support to Desig-
nated Terrorist Organizations (Fundraising) (18 U.S.C. 2339B), U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-16-providing-materi
al-support-designated-terrorist-organizations [https://perma.cc/969S-GEU8].
50 U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, Criminal Resource Manual Section 15: Providing
Material Support to Terrorists (18 U.S.C. § 2339A), U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://
www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-15-providing-material-sup
port-terrorists-18-usc-2339a [https://perma.cc/8JRQ-LUPQ].
51 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41333, TERRORIST MATERIAL SUP-
PORT: AN OVERVIEW OF 18. U.S.C. §2339A AND §2339B, at 1 (2016).
52 See id. at 5.
53 Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185,1187 (C.D.
Cal. 2004).  The Humanitarian Law Project had originally filed suit after the origi-
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half of organizations and individuals who supported designated
FTOs by providing medical and humanitarian aid, argued that
the “material support” provision was void for vagueness.54  The
Humanitarian Law Project also contended that the statute vio-
lated the First and Fifth Amendments because it is unconstitu-
tional to criminalize a group that has a protected right of
association with a FTO when the “material support” provided is
for the FTO’s nonviolent and charitable endeavors.55  After a
California district court concluded that a person of “ordinary
intelligence” could not “reasonably” decipher the meaning of
“expert advice or assistance,” “training,” or “personnel,” Con-
gress amended § 2339B under IRTPA in 2004.56  The amend-
ment clarified the constitutionally vague terms but also added
“services,” which Congress failed to define, under the prohib-
ited actions of “material support.”57
In 2009, the Supreme Court agreed to review the Ninth
Circuit’s decision that “training,” “expert advice and assis-
tance,” and “services” remained unconstitutionally vague de-
spite the amendments.58  The Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit’s decision, holding that § 2339B was not void for
vagueness as to the plaintiffs’ proposed conduct because a per-
son of ordinary intelligence would reasonably understand their
activities to fall within the statute’s definitions.59  Likewise, the
Court found that § 2339B did not violate the plaintiffs’ freedom
of speech because “the statute is carefully drawn to cover only
a narrow category of speech to, under the direction of, or in
coordination with foreign groups that the speaker knows to be
terrorist organizations.”60  The Court also rejected the plain-
nal inception of § 2339B and before the modifications. See generally Humanita-
rian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding, in
part, that §§ 2339A and 2339B remain constitutional in light of the First Amend-
ment challenge).
54 Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 1199–1200.
55 See COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 27, at 164–65. R
56 See Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 1199–1200; DOYLE, supra note 51, at R
15–17; see also Federal Court Strikes Down Part of the “USA PATRIOT Act,” FREE
EXPRESSION POL’Y PROJ., http://www.fepproject.org/news/humanlawproj.html
[https://perma.cc/JV4V-U6RC] (“The most recent decision . . . is a good reminder
of the importance of the courts in setting some limits on government action at a
time when the public’s justified fear of terrorism has been used to compromise
civil liberties in ways that often do not really improve our security or safety.”).
57 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 27, at 165. R
58 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 14 (2010); cf. DOYLE,
supra note 51, at 15–17 (“Congress adjusted some of the definitions in the wake of R
First Amendment overbreadth and due process vagueness challenges that the
Supreme Court ultimately addressed in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.”).
59 Holder, 561 U.S. at 20–25.
60 Id. at 26.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-1\CRN105.txt unknown Seq: 13 15-NOV-17 14:46
2017] BEWARE THE “TERROR GAP” 217
tiffs’ argument that § 2339B violated their First Amendment
right to freedom of association, distinguishing “mere associa-
tion” from association that includes the provision of “material
support.”61
Both § 2339A and § 2339B have become choice provisions
for federal prosecutors to use in charging alleged terrorists or
sympathizers.  The language of “material support” in many
ways serves as an alternate definition of terrorist—namely, you
qualify as a terrorist when you provide “material support” to
another terrorist or FTO.  Congress and the Supreme Court
have made it clear that once an individual crosses this statu-
tory line, federal law enforcement can arrest and prosecute
under § 2339A or § 2339B.62  But prosecutors still have wide
discretion on how to interpret “material support.”63  There is no
requirement that prosecutors show that the individual “en-
gaged in terrorism, aided or abetted terrorism, or conspired to
commit terrorism.”64  Thus, a tension emerges between “mate-
rial support” prosecution and civil liberties, an issue that will
only continue to escalate as the nature of terrorism shifts to
homegrown violent extremism and U.S.-based radicalization.
3. Current Terrorism Trends: Homegrown Violent
Extremists
Described by the FBI as “looking for needles in a nation-
wide haystack . . . figur[ing] out which pieces of hay might
someday become needles,” counterterrorism efforts targeting
HVEs in the United States have posed significant challenges to
the IC.65  The Department of Justice has defined HVEs as:
[T]hose who encourage, endorse, condone, justify, or support
the commission of a violent criminal act to achieve political,
ideological, religious, social, or economic goals by a citizen or
61 Id. at 39–40.
62 For example, federal authorities arrested a transit police officer for provid-
ing material support to ISIL. See Rachel Weiner, Police Officer for D.C. Subway




63 See COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 27, at 165; Norman Abrams, The Material R
Support Terrorism Offenses: Perspectives Derived from the (Early) Model Penal
Code, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 5, 7 (2005).  The government is also using
these offenses as a basis for early intervention, a kind of criminal early-warning
and preventive enforcement device designed to minimize the risk of terrorist activ-
ity. See id. at 7, 21–30 (discussing the mens rea requirement for crimes of “mate-
rial support”).
64 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 27, at 165. R
65 Comey, supra note 1; see Rasmussen, supra note 22. R
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long-term resident of a Western country who has rejected
Western cultural values, beliefs, and norms.  [HVEs] are a
diverse group of individuals that can include U.S.-born citi-
zens, naturalized citizens, green card holders or other long-
term residents, foreign students, or illegal immigrants.  Re-
gardless of their citizenship status, these individuals intend
to commit terrorist acts inside Western countries or against
Western interests abroad.66
An HVE is closely related to a lone offender, also known as a
lone wolf, for which the U.S. government has no universal defi-
nition.  In 2015, Georgetown University’s National Security
Critical Issue Task Force suggested defining lone wolf terrorism
as “[t]he deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through
violence or threat of violence committed by a single actor who
pursues political change linked to a formulated ideology,
whether his own or that of a larger organization, and who does
not receive orders, direction, or material support from outside
sources.”67  A significant difference between the lexicon for
HVEs and lone offenders is that the former does not necessarily
operate in isolation—the two are not mutually exclusive.  For
example, a lone offender can be an HVE if the lone offender was
radicalized primarily within the United States.68  Likewise,
66 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., AWARENESS BRIEF:
HOMEGROWN VIOLENT EXTREMISM 1 & 4 n.1 (2014) (footnote omitted) (citing IACP
COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM (CVE) WORKING GROUP, A
COMMON LEXICON 1 (2012), theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/IACP-COT_CommonLexi
con_Eng_FINALAug12.pdf [https://perma.cc/UHK2-UT5B]), http://www.iacp.
org/Portals/0/documents/HomegrownViolentExtremismAwarenessBrief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NXX2-HL8D] (creating a definition for “homegrown violent ex-
tremist” from IACP’s definitions for “violent extremist” and “homegrown violent
extremist”).
67 See LYDIA ALFARO-GONZALEZ ET AL., NAT’L SECURITY CRITICAL ISSUE TASK FORCE,
GEO. UNIV., REPORT: LONE WOLF TERRORISM 9 (2015) (emphasis omitted).
68 In 2016, a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) report from the Home-
land Security Advisory Committee adopted a definition of radicalization from John
Horgan and Kurt Braddock’s article entitled Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Chal-
lenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Programs, which defines
radicalization as “[t]he social and psychological process of incrementally exper-
ienced commitment to extremist political or religious ideology.  Radicalization may
not necessary [sic] lead to violence but it is one of the several risk factors required
for this.” COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM (CVE) SUBCOMM., HOMELAND SEC. ADVI-
SORY COUNCIL, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., INTERIM REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
33 (2016) (citing John Horgan & Kurt Braddock, Rehabilitating the Terrorists?:
Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Programs, 22 TER-
RORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 267, 279 (2010)), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/HSAC/HSAC%20CVE%20Final%20Interim%20Report%20Ju
ne%209%202016%20508%20compliant.pdf [https://perma.cc/P43S-YKWA].
According to Faiza Patel, DHS has in the past defined radicalization “as the
process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use,
support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change.” FAIZA PATEL,
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HVE is not synonymous with domestic terrorist.69
An HVE operating as a lone offender poses a particularly
challenging issue for counterterrorism efforts, as these opera-
tors are essentially invisible and hard to predict.  The growth of
the Internet and its increased accessibility has “accelerat[ed]”
radicalization.70  FTOs, like al-Qaeda and ISIL, have capitalized
on this means of radicalization and have found success in us-
ing forums, publications, and social media to radicalize individ-
uals around the world essentially anonymously.  Immediately
after the Orlando attack, al-Qaeda released an online supple-
ment to its propaganda magazine, Inspire, which was specifi-
cally aimed at providing guidance for the “Lone Mujahid.”71  In
addition to praising Mateen’s tactical decisions and offering
suggestions on how HVEs and lone offenders can make attacks
more deadly, the online pamphlet emphasized that al-Qaeda
supports individuals acting in the name of jihad even if they do
not claim allegiance to al-Qaeda: “Lone Jihad is not monopo-
lized by al-Qaida (sic) or any other group, therefore we call
upon all active Jihadi groups, to adopt and build upon the idea
of Lone Jihad and call towards it.”72  Similarly, the most recent
issue of ISIL’s propaganda magazine, Dabiq, specifically fo-
cused its message on the conversion to Islam of non-Mus-
lims.73  Whereas in the past Dabiq had concentrated its
message for audiences in Muslim-majority countries, this issue
calls for “breaking the cross” and a reversion from Christianity.
The result of this targeted rhetoric is that individuals can util-
ize the instructions and directions of major FTOs without ever
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, RETHINKING RADICALIZATION 42 n.84 (2011) (quoting The
Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 1 (2007) (written testimony
of Michael Chertoff, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec.)).
69 See JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42536, THE DOMESTIC
TERRORIST THREAT: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 8–9 (2013); supra notes
17, 31–34 and accompanying text. R
70 Gordon Lederman, Insider Threats: Homegrown Terrorism in the 21st Cen-
tury, in PATRIOTS DEBATE: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 16, 16
(Harvey Rishikof, Stewart Baker & Bernard Horowitz eds., 2012).
71 See Oren Segal, New AQAP Publication Encourages Additional Attacks Fol-
lowing Orlando, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE BLOG (June 27, 2016), https://www.adl
.org/blog/new-aqap-publication-encourages-additional-attacks-following-or
lando [https://perma.cc/4ZVL-UK4T].
72 See id. ((sic) in original) (quoting Inspire Guide: Orlando Operation, LONE
JIHAD GUIDE TEAM, AL QAEDA IN THE ARAB PENINSULA (June 17, 2016), https://
azelin.files.wordpress.com/2016/06/al-qacc84_idah-in-the-arabian-peninsula-
22inspire-guide-orlando-operation22.pdf [https://perma.cc/KT99-7A5E]).
73 Break the Cross, DABIQ, July 2016, at 46, http://www.clarionproject.org/
factsheets-files/islamic-state-magazine-dabiq-fifteen-breaking-the-cross.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DW93-D98J].
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needing to be on their radar, let alone making themselves vul-
nerable to discovery and prosecution by the U.S. authorities
through activities like an official claim of allegiance, travel to a
country known to have terrorist safe-harbors, or the provision
of “material support.”  This added layer of anonymity encour-
ages a more diverse array of people to become radicalized, al-
though patterns suggest that HVEs are most likely to be male
and under thirty years old.74
The idea of “crowd-sourced” terrorism has fed into fears
within the United States,75 with 86% of Americans either “very
concerned or somewhat concerned” about HVEs operating as
lone offenders.76  And these fears are well founded.  For exam-
ple, there were at least seventy-five terrorist plots linked to ISIL
against Western countries from early 2014 to early 2016, with
twenty-seven plots targeting U.S. interests at home or over-
seas.77  Of those plots, 42.67% were successfully executed,
66.67% were “inspired” by ISIL (in contrast to being “directed”
by ISIL), and 54% involved a lone offender.78
Although the IC has shifted its strategies in response to
this new threat environment,79 agencies continue to rely on
various watchlist screening systems developed in response to
the PATRIOT Act and other legislation passed in response to
9/11.  But the nature of terrorism has changed since the im-
mediate aftermath of 9/11: this is a “new era in which central-
ized leadership of a terrorist organization matters less; group
identity is more fluid; and violent extremist narratives focus on
a wider range of alleged grievances and enemies.”80  The story
74 See Lederman, supra note 70, at 21 (citing DAVID SCHANZER, CHARLES KURZ- R
MAN & EBRAHIM MOOSA, ANTI-TERROR LESSONS OF MUSLIM-AMERICANS 10 (2010)).  Re-
search indicates that 90% of suspects involved in ISIS-linked terrorist plots were
men, and 94% were under the age of thirty-four. HOMELAND SEC. COMM., U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, #TERROR GONE VIRAL: OVERVIEW OF THE 75 ISIS-LINKED
PLOTS AGAINST THE WEST: 2014–2016, at 4, 7 (2016), https://homeland.house.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Report-Terror-Gone-Viral-1.pdf [https://perma.
cc/HYW5-VFYF].
75 See HOMELAND SEC. COMM., supra note 74, at 5. R
76 Taylor R. Applegate, Reassessing the Threat of Homegrown Violent Extrem-
ism in the United States: Overstated or Underestimated?, SMALL WARS J. (Oct. 1,
2016, 8:55 AM), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/reassessing-the-threat-
of-homegrown-violent-extremism-in-the-united-states-overstated-or-un [https://
perma.cc/3GEW-U68P].
77 See HOMELAND SEC. COMM., supra note 74, at 5. R
78 Id. at 4–5.
79 See Current Terrorist Threat to the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 114th Cong. (2015) (prepared statement of Nicholas
J. Rasmussen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center).
80 BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON
TERRORISM 2014, at 8 (2015).
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of Omar Mateen illustrates that the current watchlist system is
failing to keep up with the threat of HVEs and lone offenders.
Even if the system is working as a whole, it is displaying vul-
nerabilities that will only become more obvious, and evidence
suggests that attacks conducted by HVEs and lone offenders
will only continue to increase.  As former National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice testified, “[T]hose charged with pro-
tecting [the United States] from attack have to succeed 100
percent of the time. . . . [T]he terrorists only have to succeed
once, and we know they are trying every day.”81
B. U.S. Terrorist Watchlist System: The Terrorist
Screening Center82
In September 2003, President George W. Bush signed
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6), which
called for the creation of an integrated screening and informa-
tion system.83  Less than three months later, the Terrorist
Screening Center (TSC) was established as the governing body
responsible for maintaining a central repository for intelligence
gathered on known or suspected terrorists.84  Although the FBI
is the mandated administrator of the TSC, the entire IC con-
tributes to the staffing and function of its 24/7 operational
requirements.85  This coordinated system improves the com-
munication problems between the IC and law enforcement bod-
ies as evident in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 through the
81 Opening Remarks: Hearing Before the Nat’l Comm’n. on Terrorist Attacks
upon the U.S., 108th Cong. (2004) (prepared statement of Dr. Condoleezza Rice,
National Security Advisor).
82 This Note relies on an open-source analysis of the watchlist system, as
many of the operational and intelligence-related intricacies of the system remain
classified. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT
REPORT 07-41, FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER xviii (2007),
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/FBI/a0741/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/L388-
8WFH] [hereinafter DOJ AUDIT OF THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER] (discussing
TSC’s “nondisclosure policy [that] protects U.S. counterterrorism operations and
intelligence objectives and safeguards the personnel involved in these sensitive
activities”).  For a comprehensive, probability-based understanding of the
watchlist system, see MARC SAGEMAN, MISUNDERSTANDING TERRORISM 55–87 (2017).
83 Press Release, President George W. Bush, Homeland Security Presidential
Directive/HSPD-6: Integration and Use of Screening Information (Sept. 16, 2003),
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-6.html [https://perma.cc/UJY9-JUJZ].
84 JEROME P. BJELOPERA, BART ELIAS & ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R44678, THE TERRORIST SCREENING DATABASE AND PREVENTING TERRORIST TRAVEL 1–4
(2016).
85 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 82, at R
iv; Five Years After the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act: Stopping
Terrorist Travel: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental
Affairs, 111th Cong. 1–2 (2009) (prepared statement of Timothy J. Healy, Direc-
tor, Terrorist Screening Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
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passage of the PATRIOT Act and the release of the 9/11 Com-
mission Report.86
1. The Terrorist Screening Database
The TSC maintains the Terrorist Screening Database.  The
TSDB is a sensitive database consisting of unclassified “iden-
tity information of those who are known to be or reasonably
suspected of being involved in terrorist activities.”87  According
to a 2016 congressional report, the TSC consists of three main
processes: nomination, verification, and screening.88
During the nomination process to include an individual in
TSDB, IC analysts “nominat[e]” individuals for inclusion in
TSDB based on “raw” intelligence.89  For individuals already
being investigated by the FBI, the nomination process starts
when the “nominating official” sends an email to the Terrorist
Review and Examination Unit (TREX) at FBI headquarters.90
This email contains the following attachments: an opening
Electronic Communication, a Notice of Initiation, and a com-
pleted electronic form FD-930 requesting the subject be en-
tered in the National Criminal Information Center’s (NCIC)
“Known or Suspected Terrorist File” (KST File)—a database
that emerged from the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization
File (VGTOF), which had been implemented in 1994 to track
criminal and terrorist organizations and which, in 2009, the
government split into the “Gang File” and KST File.91  After
86 See supra section I.A.1.
87 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER - FAQS 1 (2017),
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/terrorist-screening-center-frequently-asked-
questions.pdf/view [https://perma.cc/32JY-R7MJ] [hereinafter FBI FAQs].
88 See BJELOPERA, ELIAS & SISKIN, supra note 84, at 3. R
89 Id. at 4.
90 See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, Section 19-06 (U) TERRORISM SCREENING
PROCEDURES (WATCHLISTING) (2011), https://epic.org/privacy/airtravel/EPIC_DOJ
_FOIA_NoFlyList_09_13_11_Screening_Procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RPF-
7AUF] [hereinafter FBI WATCHLISTING].
91 Id.; COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, SF-115-109, RE-
QUEST FOR RECORDS DISPOSITION AUTHORITY (2008), https://www.archives.gov/
records-mgmt/rcs/schedules/departments/department-of-justice/rg-0065/n1-
065-08-011_sf115.pdf [https://perma.cc/SL8R-DGHA].  The VGTOF was origi-
nally created as a hybrid terrorism and criminal database. See Statement Before
the S. Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Washington DC, 108th
Cong. 1 (2003) (prepared statement of Michael D. Kirkpatrick, Assistant Director
in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, TRAPPED IN A
BLACK BOX: GROWING TERRORISM WATCHLISTING IN EVERYDAY POLICING 5 n.11 (2016)
[hereinafter TRAPPED IN A BLACK BOX].  Within the KST File, each entry is assigned a
handling code that serves as guidance for law enforcement officials who may
encounter the individual. See COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION, COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAM GUIDANCE, WATCHLISTING, ADMINISTRATIVE AND OP-
ERATIONAL GUIDANCE 5–8 (2010), https://epic.org/privacy/airtravel/
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review, TREX forwards the attachments to the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) for those known or suspected
terrorists designated as “international terrorists.”92
During the verification process, NCTC primarily decides
whether nominated individuals meet the criteria to be included
in TSDB as known or suspected terrorists.93  In order for a
nominated individual to be verified for inclusion in TSDB,
NCTC must satisfy two requirements.  First, all nominations
must satisfy the “reasonable suspicion watchlisting stan-
dard.”94  This standard requires that NCTC demonstrate to
TSC that the nominating official selected the individual for
TSDB based on an “objective factual basis.”95  Using a totality
of the circumstances test, NCTC must show that the IC ana-
lysts relied upon “ ‘articulable’ intelligence or information which
. . . reasonably warrants a determination that the subject is
known or suspected to be (or has been) knowingly engaged in
conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to
terrorism or terrorist activities.”96  For example, NCTC evalu-
ates Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE)—an
NCTC system containing primarily classified information on
known or suspected terrorists—to verify intelligence gathered
on nominees.97  Second, even if the TSC concludes that NCTC
met the “reasonable suspicion watchlisting standard,” NCTC
must provide a minimum amount of identifying information for
EPIC_DOJ_FOIA_NoFlyList_09_13_11_CT_Guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/
878T-VTVL] [hereinafter FBI MEMO ON COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAM].
92 See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2012); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, AUDIT REPORT 08-16, AUDIT OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TERRORIST
WATCHLIST NOMINATION PROCESSES 6 (2008), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/plus/
a0816/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FDD-A56G].  TSC directly handles all “do-
mestic terrorists.”
93 The FBI’s TREX processes its own TSDB nominations, except for nomina-
tions that are “purely international suspects.” See BJELOPERA, ELIAS & SISKIN,
supra note 84, at 4–5.  Before 2009, TREX entered all nominations sent to NCTC R
into VGTOF, regardless of what NCTC ultimately did with the information.  Thus,
as a matter of presumed efficiency, no automatic link existed between TSDB and
these VGTOF submissions, and any modifications or changes made by TSC on
TSDB, which would traditionally move “downstream” into VGTOF, failed to do so
for these NCTC and TSC “bypassing” submissions.  This “cumbersome” process
was a highlight of a 2007 DOJ audit of the watchlisting system and emphasizes
the historic inefficiencies that the modern watchlist system is built upon. See
DOJ AUDIT OF THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER, supra note 82, at viii–x. R
94 See BJELOPERA, ELIAS & SISKIN, supra note 84, at 5. R
95 See FBI MEMO ON COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAM, supra note 91, at 3. R
96 Id.; FBI FAQS, supra note 87, at 2. R
97 TIDE supplies “downstream” intelligence to TSDB. See NAT’L COUNTERTER-
RORISM CTR., TERRORIST IDENTITIES DATAMART ENVIRONMENT (TIDE) (2017), https://
www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/features_documents/TIDEfactsheet10FEB
2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/J64Q-92Q8].
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a nomination to qualify for TSDB.98  To qualify for inclusion in
TSDB, the nominating official must include the nominee’s “last
name ‘and at least one additional piece of identifying informa-
tion’” such as date of birth, place of birth, social security
number, physical identifiers, and known locations.99
During the third phase, the screening process, federal
agencies inside and outside of the IC can “export” the records
included in TSDB and incorporate them into their own
database systems.100  This creates a “downstream” of informa-
tion flowing from TSDB as the centralized system to other agen-
cies and law enforcement organizations.  Agencies such as the
Department of Homeland Security (including the Customs and
Border Patrol (CBP)), the Department of State, and other travel-
related agencies use TSDB’s “downstream” model to facilitate
their missions and accentuate their own screening
databases.101  For example, CBP maintains its own screening
system called the TECS System (TECS), in addition to an Auto-
mated Targeting System (ATS) that allows for “risk-based
targeting scenarios and assessments”—both systems rely
heavily on TSDB information.102  When a CBP officer en-
counters an individual at a border crossing, the individual’s
information is run against TECS and ATS, and it is then sent to
the TSC.  If there is a positive hit, TSC forwards the information
to the FBI for review, and the FBI will then alert law enforce-
ment if further action is required.103
98 BJELOPERA, ELIAS & SISKIN, supra note 84, at 5–6; see also FBI WATCHLISTING, R
supra note 90, at 4 (providing a full list of the identifier requirements). R
99 BJELOPERA, ELIAS & SISKIN, supra note 84, at 6 (quoting OFFICE OF THE INSPEC- R
TOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT REPORT 14-16 AUDIT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION’S TERRORIST WATCHLIST NOMINATION 3 (2014), https://oig.justice.
gov/reports/2014/a1416.pdf [https://perma.cc/3B8Q-YTBT]); FBI MEMO ON
COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAM, supra note 91, at 20. R
100 See DOJ AUDIT OF THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER, supra note 82, at iii–viii. R
101 See BJELOPERA, ELIAS & SISKIN, supra note 84, at 7–9. R
102 Id. at 3, 8 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/CBP/PIA-006(d),
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE AUTOMATED TARGETING SYSTEM – TSA/
CBP COMMON OPERATING PICTURE PHASE II, at 1 (2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/privacy_pia_cbp_tsacop_09162014.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/R9FP-XYYC]).
103 For a detailed summary of a hypothetical encounter, see OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT REPORT 05-27 REVIEW OF THE TERRORIST
SCREENING CENTER 37–39 (2005), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/FBI/a0527/fi-
nal.pdf [https://perma.cc/56JJ-HBSL]; DOJ AUDIT OF THE TERRORIST SCREENING
CENTER supra note 82, at iv–vi. R
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2. The No Fly List
The Transportation Security Administration also queries
data from TSDB but primarily draws information from TSDB’s
subdatabases including the No Fly List.104  The No Fly List is a
narrow offshoot of the TSDB, specifically tailored to prevent “an
individual who may present a threat to civil aviation or national
security from boarding a commercial aircraft that traverses
U.S. airspace.”105  As of June 17, 2016, the No Fly List con-
tained around 81,000 records with 1% of those records consist-
ing of “U.S. persons”; in contrast, TSDB includes around 1
million records with 0.5% of those records consisting of “U.S.
persons.”106
The No Fly List is more selective than TSDB and has
unique “minimum substantive derogatory criteria require-
ments.”107  Most of the requirements remain classified; how-
ever, the process seems to involve the same general pattern as
that modeled from TSDB selection.
One such requirement, declassified in 2011 as part of a
Freedom of Information Act, or FOIA, request, indicates that
the minimum identifying information required to include some-
one on the No Fly List is a first name, last name, and date of
birth.108  There is also an “expedited nomination” process for
nominations to the No Fly List that bypasses some of the nor-
mal review and oversight processes required of a routine TSDB
104 See Ensuring America’s Safety: Cleaning Up the Nation’s Watchlists: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Transp. Sec. and Infrastructure Prot. of the H. Comm.
on Homeland Sec., 110th Cong. 15–17 (2008) (prepared statement of Richard S.
Kopel, Principal Deputy Director, Terrorist Screening Center, Federal Bureau of
Investigation).  Other TSDB subdatabases with higher selectivity criteria include
the Selectee List and Expanded Selectee List. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMPLEMENTATION AND COORDINATION OF TSA’S SECURE FLIGHT
PROGRAM (REDACTED) 11 (2012), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/
OIGr_12-94_Jul12.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q92-8GT2]; OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ROLE OF THE NO FLY AND SELECTEE LISTS IN SECURING
COMMERCIAL AVIATION (REDACTED) 10 (2009), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/
Mgmt/OIGr_09-64_Jul09.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZA7-N9GF] [hereinafter INSPEC-
TOR GEN., ROLE OF THE NO FLY].
105 See FBI FAQs, supra note 87, at 2. R
106 OFFICE OF SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN, FINDINGS FROM JOINT RESPONSE FROM THE
NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER (NCTC) AND THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION (FBI) TO CONGRESSIONAL QUESTIONS REGARDING THE TERRORIST IDENTITIES





107 INSPECTOR GEN., ROLE OF THE NO FLY, supra note 104, at 9, 54. R
108 See FBI MEMO ON COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAM, supra note 91, at 12. R
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nomination.109  TSC directly makes a decision on the nomina-
tion, but they are required to initially meet the normal TSDB
inclusion requirements of the “reasonable suspicion watchlist-
ing standard” and the production of identifying information
threshold.110  Once included on the No Fly List, the record is
then sent to NCTC for post-hoc review and inclusion in TIDE
(or to TREX Unit for domestic terrorists records).  Within sev-
enty-two hours of the expedited nomination, if the nominating
official does not complete the normal TSDB nomination process
along with meeting the more stringent standards to be included
on the No Fly List, then the individual’s record is removed from
the No Fly List and TSDB.111
Overall, the lack of transparency for nominations to the No
Fly List remains a challenge to its constitutional legitimacy.
TSC has an obligation to constantly update and remove records
from TSDB and its subdatabases, but the process is not well-
defined in the public record.112  For example, TSC’s Nomina-
tions and Data Integrity Unit periodically reviews the records
during a process called Quality Assurance Special Projects;
however, it is unknown how frequently this review is con-
ducted.113  Additionally, there is a redress system in place for
individuals who challenge their inclusion on the list and a sift-
ing system, called the Terrorist Encounter Review Process, that
“automatically” reviews the database to ensure there is no re-
dundancy or improper inclusion.114  Despite these processes in
place, the general “secrecy” of the system has opened the door
for litigation over the erroneous inclusions of individuals on the
No Fly List.115  There is a public concern that any inaccuracy
stemming from the shadows of TSDB or the No Fly List will
allow for an unchecked system of racial and ethnic profiling,
will infringe upon due process rights, and will pose a challenge
to other constitutionally protected fundamental rights.116
109 See DOJ AUDIT OF THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER, supra note 82, at R
41–43; FBI WATCHLISTING, supra note 90. R
110 BJELOPERA, ELIAS & SISKIN, supra note 84, at 5; FBI MEMO ON COUNTERTER- R
RORISM PROGRAM, supra note 91, at 3; see FBI WATCHLISTING, supra note 90. R
111 FBI WATCHLISTING, supra note 90. R
112 See id.
113 See INSPECTOR GEN., ROLE OF THE NO FLY, supra note 104, at 13. R
114 See Kopel, supra note 104. R
115 Irina D. Manta & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Secret Jurisdiction, 65 EM-
ORY L.J. 1313, 1319 (2016); see also Shirin Sinnar, Towards a Fairer Terrorist
Watchlist, 40 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 4, 4–5 (2015) (questioning the “opaque”
watchlisting process).
116 See, e.g., JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43730, TERRORIST
DATABASES AND THE NO FLY LIST: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND HURDLES TO LITIGATION
9–19 (2015) (arguing that the No Fly List could potentially violate a person’s
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C. Current U.S. Gun Regulations and the “Terror Gap”
Concurrent with the establishment of the United States,
gun ownership and the right to bear arms has been an intri-
cate, yet controversial, part of American history.  In 1791, Con-
gress adopted the Second Amendment to ensure that: “[a] well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.”117  Yet while Federalists and Anti-Federalists ar-
gued the merits of the Bill of Rights in light of federalism, there
was disagreement in Congress and among the general public
over the role of the militia and the possession of arms in the
post-Revolution society.118  In 1788, Alexander Hamilton wrote
in Federalist No. 29 that:
There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the
idea of danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a loss
whether to treat it with gravity or with raillery; . . . [w]here in
the name of COMMON-SENSE, are our fears to end if we may not
trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citi-
zens?  What shadow of danger can there be from men who are
daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen and who
participate with them in the same feelings, sentiments, hab-
its and interests?119
Hamilton’s plea for “common-sense” failed to reverberate.  Even
James Madison, the author of the Second Amendment, argued
in his 1789 speech to Congress in favor of the Bill of Rights
that, “the greatest danger lies . . . in the body of the people,
operating by the majority against the minority.”120  Neverthe-
constitutionally protected interest in, for example, international travel and free-
dom from reputational harm or stigma).
117 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
118 The debate over the Second Amendment extends past mere counterterror-
ism concerns. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. BELLESILES, ARMING AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A
NATIONAL GUN CULTURE 215–18 (2000) (detailing the history of gun culture in the
United States); SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS
AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 62–65 (2006) (evaluating Congres-
sional and public opinion toward the Second Amendment at the time of its
adoption).
119 THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, at 144 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
(emphasis added); see also David W. Brown, How Hamilton Solved America’s Gun
Problem — 228 Years Ago, WEEK (June 15, 2016), http://theweek.com/articles/
629815/how-alexander-hamilton-solved-americas-gun-problem—228-years-ago
[https://perma.cc/V5FN-LASD] (arguing that Hamilton might have resolved the
gun debate in 1788 during discussions over the language of the Second
Amendment).
120 James Madison, Speech in Defense of the Bill of Rights (June 8, 1789)
(transcript available at  https://www.wwnorton.com/college/history/archive/
reader/trial/directory/1783_1790/ch08_madison_speech.htm [https://perma.
cc/Z656-9XUA]).
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less, the Second Amendment passed as a provision wrought
with disagreement and varying interpretations.121  An essential
part of understanding modern gun regulations and policy is
acknowledging that there was not and has never been a con-
sensus as to the Second Amendment’s scope and meaning.
In 2008, the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller
held in a 5–4 decision that private citizens have a right to gun
ownership independent from serving in a militia.122  Writing for
the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia dissected the language of
the Second Amendment to conclude that the District of Colum-
bia’s handgun ban and the trigger-lock requirement violated
the constitutional guarantee of an individual’s right to bear
arms.123  Yet Justice Scalia explicitly acknowledged that the
private right to bear arms is not without limitations and stated
that the Court “do[es] not read the Second Amendment to pro-
tect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confronta-
tion.”124  Justice Scalia further noted that “nothing in our
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on . . . laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
arms.”125  Given this interpretation, there is not a universal,
unlimited right to gun ownership in the United States.  There-
fore, legislation and programs that regulate the purchase of
guns, such as the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act
(Brady Act) and the National Instant Criminal Background
Check System (NICS), remain constitutional following
Heller.126
Congress passed the Brady Act in 1993, which in part
mandated the creation of a national background check system
that screens buyers prior to any firearm purchase.127
Launched in 1998, NICS requires Federal Firearms Licensees
(FFLs)—licensed gun sellers—to run a background check on all
prospective buyers via a FBI-based system maintained in coor-
121 See CORNELL, supra note 118, at 64–65. R
122 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (5–4 decision)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791
(2010) (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the
Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.”).
123 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595; DAVID DEGRAZIA & LESTER H. HUNT, DEBATING
GUN CONTROL: HOW MUCH REGULATION DO WE NEED? 134 (2016).
124 Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (alteration in original).
125 Id. at 626–27.
126 In the dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens takes Scalia’s concession a step
further by questioning whether the majority provided any support for the proposi-
tion that the Second Amendment can “limit the power of Congress to regulate
civilian uses of weapons.” Id. at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103–159, 107 Stat.
1536 (1993) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–22 (2012)).
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dination with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF) as well as state and local law enforcement
entities.128  A NICS query is considered “instantaneous”; in
2015, the total processing time averaged 446.3 seconds for
phone queries and 107.5 seconds for e-checks.  Once a pro-
spective buyer completes the ATF Form 447, the FFL contacts
the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division’s NICS
Section either through telephone to the NICS Contracted Call
Centers or through an e-check method.  NICS runs queries on
the information provided using three databases: Interstate
Identification Index, National Crime Information Center, and
the NICS Index.129  If there are no automatic hits, the transac-
tion is approved.  If there is an automatic hit, the transaction is
“delayed” while the background check gets transferred to a
NICS Legal Instruments Examiner (NICS Examiner).130
The NICS Examiner, unlike those at the NICS Contracted
Call Centers, has access to the sensitive information raised
during the query and makes the determination as to the exis-
tence of “prohibitive criteria” based on either 18 U.S.C. § 922 or
state law.131  If the NICS Examiner finds the existence of “po-
tentially prohibitive criteria,” then the transaction is again
“delayed” and the NICS Examiner has three business days to
research the individual.  After three business days, the applica-
tion will be approved, denied, or remain pending without a
“final determination” status.  If the latter, the FFL has discre-
tion to either approve or deny the transaction; however, the
FFL is bound by state law as well as ATF Form 4473 line 21d,
which requires the FFL to record all instances where a firearm
was transferred under the no “final determination” status.
Even if NICS fails to provide a final determination, NICS Exam-
iners can continue investigating the case for ninety days.132
Any individuals denied the purchase of a gun are able to appeal
the decision through the NICS Section.
Not all U.S. states satisfy the background check require-
ments under the Brady Act using NICS Section directly.  While
128 See About NICS, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/
cjis/nics/about-nics [https://perma.cc/WV8N-77Q9].
129 The NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, BUREAU JUST. STAT. (last
updated Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=TP&tid=49 [https://
perma.cc/CC7A-Y3VY].
130 See About NICS, supra note 128. R
131 Id.
132 Press Release, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, GAO: 91 Percent on Terrorist Watch
List Pass Firearm Background Checks (June 15, 2016), https://www.fein
stein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=504741EF-A600-4FA4-BE
0C-71CDDB0F97CC [https://perma.cc/T4BA-5TFW].
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thirty-six U.S. states and territories have adopted NICS in its
entirety, thirteen states are Full Point-of-Contact (Full POC)
states that administer their own form of NICS in compliance
with the Brady Act.133  And seven states are Partial Point-of-
Contact (Partial POC) states that use NICS for long gun134
purchases but maintain a Brady-compliant state agency for
running background checks on handgun purchases.  Never-
theless, all U.S. states and territories, regardless of NICS sta-
tus, rely to some degree on the federal databases associated
with NICS.
Yet despite the overwhelming reliance on federal databases
(specifically FBI-administered databases) for Brady-mandated
background checks, there is a considerable lack of overlap be-
tween NICS and TSDB.  Only since 2004 have NICS queries
included a search of NCIC’s VGTOF records, specifically known
since 2009 as the KST File.135  Although TSC technically main-
tains the KST File as part of the watchlist nomination process,
the KST File falls under NCIC as one of its twenty-one files that
functions under a “shared management concept” between FBI
and other federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies.136
Essentially, the KST File is a “downstream” version of TSDB.137
And as a “downstream” database, the validity of NICS using the
KST File as its main counterterrorism tool is questionable.
When “downstream” watchlist databases “export” the in-
formation from TSDB, there is a copy-paste transfer of informa-
tion.  Thus, in using the KST File, NICS relies on a watered-
down version of TSDB that was originally created as a pre-9/11
hybrid criminal database (i.e. VGTOF) and that contains “hun-
dreds of thousands of entries” while “lack[ing] adequate sub-
stantive oversight for existing entries and utiliz[ing] a low
‘reasonable suspicion’ evidentiary standard that is subject to
133 See About NICS, supra note 128. R
134 BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE, ATF E-FORM 4473 (5300.9), FIREARMS TRANSACTION RECORD (2016), https://
www.atf.gov/firearms/docs/4473-part-1-firearms-transaction-record-over-
counter-atf-form-53009/download [http://perma.cc/H48Z-27W3].
135 WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42336, TERRORIST WATCH LIST
SCREENING AND BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR FIREARMS 12–13 (2013); TRAPPED IN A BLACK
BOX, supra note 91, at 1; see supra subpart I.B. R
136 See National Crime Information Center (NCIC), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ncic [https://perma.cc/9WA4-KL9Q].
137 Statement Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Af-
fairs., 111th Cong. (2010) (prepared statement of Daniel D. Roberts, Former As-
sistant Director, Criminal Justice Information Services, Federal Bureau of
Investigation); KROUSE, supra note 135; TRAPPED IN A BLACK BOX, supra note 91, at R
16; see supra subpart I.B.
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numerous exceptions.”138  Analysts transferring names to the
KST File do not have to meet a higher “minimum substantive
derogatory criteria” threshold, as they would in TSDB sub-
databases such as the No Fly List where a higher selectivity
requirement from that of TSDB must be met prior to inclu-
sion.139  This means that there is a danger for an over-inclu-
sion of individuals in the KST File—scholars have criticized the
KST File for widespread “erroneous inclusion” and promotion
of “silent hits.”140
Similarly, there is a danger that the KST File fosters inac-
curacies and under-inclusion.  Statistics show that a high
number of NICS searches that result in positive KST File hits
eventually receive approval.  According to data from the FBI,
91% of NICS checks in 2015 that included a positive hit on the
KST File were eventually approved, with only 21 buyers out of
244 denied.141  This means that either the KST File is so over-
inclusive that it fails to properly function at all (which is un-
likely), or that there is a systemic disconnect between the stan-
dard to qualify for the KST File and the standard for getting
NICS approval.  If the latter, it could mean that the KST File is
“very rarely . . . result[ing] in arrests or detention,” either by
failing to include people in the KST File who should be there or
letting people slip through the cracks due to duplicate files or
other inaccuracies as a result of the “downstream” flow of infor-
mation.142  But it could also mean that valid known or sus-
pected terrorists, individuals who should rightly be included in
the KST File, are legally acquiring guns.  Taking it a step fur-
ther, it is unknown how many of those 223 buyers who had
positive KST File hits also appeared on the No Fly List.143  As
noted, the No Fly List has a higher selectivity requirement, but
this information remains classified, and critics for many years
have questioned the legitimacy of the standard.  How many of
these individuals on the No Fly List were able to pass NICS and
purchase a gun?  While the “prohibitive criteria” disqualifying
buyers under 18 U.S.C. § 922 does not prohibit an individual
appearing on the TSDB—including the KST File or even the No
138 TRAPPED IN A BLACK BOX, supra note 91, at 1–2. R
139 INSPECTOR GEN., ROLE OF THE NO FLY, supra note 104, at 9. R
140 TRAPPED IN A BLACK BOX, supra note 91, at 2–3, 32. R
141 See Feinstein, supra note 132. R
142 TRAPPED IN A BLACK BOX, supra note 91, at 22–23. R
143 See, e.g., David A. Graham, How Obama’s Gun-Control Push Inverted the
Politics of the No-Fly List, ATLANTIC (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/pol
itics/archive/2015/12/no-fly-list-inverted-politics/419172 [https://perma.cc/
KQ44-VQM7] (“GAO found that ‘several’ people on the no-fly list were allowed to
buy guns.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-1\CRN105.txt unknown Seq: 28 15-NOV-17 14:46
232 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:205
Fly List—from purchasing a weapon,144 there is a “common
sense” argument that a person who cannot be trusted on an
airplane should also not be trusted to buy a gun.  This is the
“terror gap.”
II
PAST AND CURRENT ATTEMPTS TO CLOSE THE “TERROR
GAP”: WHY A STATUTORY FIX IS NOT FEASIBLE
Closing the “terror gap” directly via statutory modification
appears, at first glance, to be an easy and logical fix.  For exam-
ple, Congress could amend 18 U.S.C. § 922 to include language
prohibiting known or suspected terrorists from owning a
weapon.  However, such a fix raises both constitutional and
policy issues that further splinter an already staunchly divided
political environment, making it very unlikely that Congress
will ever find a solution that satisfies both sides of the aisle.
Despite the contention, there have been several legislative
pushes to close the “terror gap” from Democrat-led, Republi-
can-led, and bipartisan initiatives.  Yet each of these initiatives
has floundered.  In this Part, I will argue there are three main
reasons why a direct statutory fix to close the “terror gap” will
fail.
First, the current political environment shuns compro-
mise.  According to the Pew Research Center, “[p]olitical polari-
zation is the defining feature of early 21st century American
politics, both among the public and elected officials.”145  Re-
gardless of the issue at hand, Congressional members (and the
public) are increasingly voting in line with their party’s plat-
form.146  When translating this divide into gun control initia-
tives, the Republican position has become synonymous with a
broad interpretation of the Second Amendment that promotes
“gun rights over gun control.”147  In 2015, a poll of the general
public indicated that 71% of Republicans favor legislation pro-
144 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat.
1536 (1993) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–22 (2012)).
145 Carroll Doherty, 7 Things to Know About Polarization in America, PEW RES.
CTR. (June 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/12/7-
things-to-know-about-polarization-in-america [https://perma.cc/HJ5A-4J3Y].
146 See, e.g., Christopher Ingraham, A Stunning Visualization of Our Divided
Congress, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/wonk/wp/2015/04/23/a-stunning-visualization-of-our-divided-con
gress/?utm_term=.021a86f6568d [https://perma.cc/9LRP-G3WT] (describing a
“political mitosis” in voting patterns between Republicans and Democrats within
the House of Representatives).
147 Amber Phillips, The NRA-ification of the Republican Party, WASH. POST: THE
FIX (Aug. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/
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tecting gun rights, while 73% of Democrats favor legislation
focusing on gun control.148  Additionally, lobbying groups such
as the National Rifle Association (NRA) remain exceptionally
powerful forces behind the Republican congressional caucus’
general reluctance to compromise on Democrat and bipartisan
initiatives to close the “terror gap.”  With constituent votes and
campaign donations on the line, Republican congressional
members feel pressure from the NRA to focus on legislation
promoting gun rights and to oppose gun control measures,
such as modifying 18 U.S.C. § 922.149
Second, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B are relatively in-
flexible in relation to the Second Amendment and are not a
statutorily viable mechanism for closing the “terror gap.”  There
is precedent for when prosecutors can use “material support,”
but these cases widely deal with First Amendment issues such
as freedom of speech and freedom of association.150  In con-
trast, there has been very little precedent for the overlap be-
tween “material support” and gun ownership, and there is none
between the “material support” provisions, NICS, and TSDB.
Prosecutors are unlikely to argue that an individual who ap-
pears in TSDB but who passes NICS and buys a gun could be
liable for “material support”—a hit on TSDB is not strong
enough, or reliable enough, to stand on its own as a means of
triggering a “material support” charge.  And with concerns sur-
rounding accuracy, over-inclusion, and under-inclusion on
TSDB, this disinclination is warranted.151  The individual
would have to buy the gun and then either provide some other
means of “material support,” such as sending money to the
terrorist group, or commit an attack before prosecutors would
be able to charge the individual.152  A counterterrorism policy
that is always a step behind is ineffective; in the age of HVEs, it
08/14/the-nra-ification-of-the-republican-party/?utm_term=.94686324267e
[https://perma.cc/J2B4-47TG].
148 PEW RESEARCH CTR., CONTINUED BIPARTISAN SUPPORT FOR EXPANDED BACK-
GROUND CHECKS ON GUN SALES: MORE POLARIZED VIEWS OF THE NRA’S INFLUENCE 6
(2015).
149 Nevertheless, while the NRA opposes background checks, the public gener-
ally supports them. See id. at 2, 4; Background Checks: NICS, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N.-
INST. FOR LEG. ACTION (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.nraila.org/issues/background-
checks-nics [https://perma.cc/BJ34-WZ84].
150 See supra section I.A.2; see, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561
U.S. 1, 39–40 (2010) (rejecting that § 2339B violated plaintiff’s First Amendment
right by distinguishing “mere association” from association that includes the pro-
vision of “material support”).
151 See TRAPPED IN A BLACK BOX, supra note 91, at 2–3. R
152 See supra section I.A.2. See generally NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., supra
note 97 (listing the types of conduct that would warrant inclusion in TIDE, includ- R
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is dangerous and counterproductive.  Therefore, any legislative
attempt to close the “terror gap” by modifying the language of
§§ 2339A and 2339B would pose potentially enormous consti-
tutional repercussions, including fears over infringement of an
individual’s guaranteed right to bear arms.  Unless the watch-
list system itself is completely overhauled, modifying §§ 2339A
and 2339B to close the “terror gap” is impractical.
Third, past statutory proposals have focused on closing the
“terror gap” through bills primarily packaged as gun control
legislation instead of national security legislation.  Ironically,
the NRA-endorsed153 George W. Bush administration was the
first to attack the apparent discontinuity between the watchlist
system and regulations surrounding gun ownership.  In a Gov-
ernment Accountability Office (GAO) report in 2005, the gov-
ernment acknowledged that, even after the NICS started to
query the TSDB in 2004, there was still a statutory hole that
did not make it illegal for a member of a terrorist organization
to purchase a gun, as long as the person successfully passed
NICS.154  The GAO recommended to Congress that the Depart-
ment of Justice reexamine the watchlist system, strengthen the
list, and reinforce FBI oversight of the system in order to pre-
vent terrorists from buying guns.155  Yet there was a decisive
flip flop of position in 2009 when President Barack Obama
assumed office.  Where Democrats had once opposed the
strengthening of TSDB, they now pursued a more aggressive
watchlisting policy centered around gun control; in contrast,
Republicans argued in favor of relaxing the watchlist system in
order to promote gun rights.  Both parties used the watchlist
system as a “tactical tool” to promote their own gun control
policy.156  No compromise was made.
Most recently, Senator Dianne Feinstein’s (D-CA) Denying
Firearms and Explosives to Dangerous Terrorists Act of 2015,
Senator John Cornyn’s (R-TX) Securing Our Homeland from
Radical Islamists and Enhancing Law Enforcement Detection
Act (SHIELD Act), and Senator Susan Collins’s (R-ME) Terrorist
ing committing an international terrorist attack, soliciting funds for a terrorist
organization, and providing material support).
153 NRA Endorses George W. Bush for President, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N.-INST. FOR
LEG. ACTION (Oct. 13, 2004), https://www.nraila.org/articles/20041013/nra-en
dorses-george-w-bush-for-preside [https://perma.cc/P9JA-W34J].
154 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-127, GUN CONTROL AND TERRORISM:
FBI COULD BETTER MANAGE FIREARM-RELATED BACKGROUND CHECKS INVOLVING TERROR-
IST WATCH LIST RECORDS 4–5 (2005).
155 See id. at 26.
156 See Graham, supra note 143. R
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Firearms Prevention Act of 2016 succumbed to the same
doomed fate.  Senator Feinstein’s amendment concentrated on
updating the language of § 922 to provide the Attorney General
with broad discretionary power to prohibit an FFL from trans-
ferring a firearm when the Attorney General determines that
the buyer (1) is a known or suspected terrorist that has “en-
gaged in conduct constituting . . . terrorism” or provided “mate-
rial support” for terrorism in accordance with §§ 2339A and
2339B and (2) “has a reasonable belief that the prospective
transferee may use a firearm in connection with terrorism.”157
The Senate voted along partisan lines to defeat the bill, with the
exception of a single Democrat and Republican.158  Despite the
bill’s attempt to maintain avenues for individuals to challenge
their status in TSDB, Republicans focused on the gun rights
argument and contended that the bill would unconstitutionally
hamper the ability of individuals who are wrongly added to
TSDB from being able to purchase a gun.159  In response, Sen-
ator Cornyn introduced the SHIELD Act.160  Backed by the
NRA,161 the SHIELD Act would grant the Attorney General dis-
cretion to delay a gun transfer for a maximum of three days
and would require federal prosecutors to make “a showing of
probable cause” that the individual is engaged in terrorist ac-
tivity prior to “permanently block[ing] the transfer.”162  This bill
157 Denying Firearms and Explosives to Dangerous Terrorists Act of 2015, S.
551, 114th Cong. (2015).
158 See Alicia Parlapiano, How Terrorism Suspects Buy Guns – and How They
Still Could, Even with a Ban, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/2016/06/14/us/gun-purchase-ban-for-suspected-terrorists.
html [https://perma.cc/Y2J3-E8QM].
159 Press Release, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Senators Introduce Bill to Stop Ter-
rorists from Buying Firearms, Explosives (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.feinstein.
senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=185a6700-38a2-45e1-ac29-
40b4b794f660 [https://perma.cc/XQ9S-HD5Q]; Burgess Everett & Seung Min
Kim, Gun Measures Fail in Senate, POLITICO (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.poli
tico.com/story/2015/12/gun-amendment-democrats-216389 [https://perma.
cc/7AST-NVGT].
160 Press Release, Sen. John Cornyn, Senate Democrats Block Cornyn Propo-




161 NRA Statement on Terror Watchlists, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N.-INST. FOR LEG. ACTION
(June 15, 2016), https://www.nraila.org/articles/20160615/nra-statement-on-
terror-watchlists [https://perma.cc/Q3MQ-8W98].
162 Press Release, Sen. John Cornyn, Cornyn Introduces Legislation to Stop
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also failed along partisan lines, in a 55–44 vote.163
Senator Feinstein and Senator Cornyn reintroduced their
respective “terror gap” legislation in June 2016 after the shoot-
ing at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando.164  With several minor
modifications, both bills remained essentially unchanged and
again failed along partisan lines.165  Looking for a bipartisan
compromise, Senator Collins tried to introduce the Terrorist
Firearms Prevention Act of 2016 that, in general, would give the
Attorney General discretion “to deny firearms sales to individu-
als who appear on the No Fly List or the Selectee List.”166  De-
spite focusing on the TSDB databases with higher “minimum
substantive derogatory criteria requirements,”167 it did not win
support among Republicans who raised due process concerns
with the bill’s failure to include a “probable cause” provision as
in Senator Cornyn’s bill.168  The bill stalled, again on partisan
lines, with a vote of 52–46.169
As these failed proposals illustrate, both Democrats and
Republicans (even the NRA) agree that, as a matter of national
security, terrorists should not own weapons.  Yet framing the
statutory fixes in terms of a gun rights versus gun control tug-
of-war has stymied efforts to cross the aisle and find a compro-
mise.  Common sense suggests that if the United States cannot
deem you safe enough to board a plane, then the United States
should not deem you safe enough to buy a firearm.  Senator
Collins’s bipartisan approach of using a more selective sub-
163 See Everett & Kim, supra note 159. R
164 See id.; 162 CONG. REC. S4289 (daily ed. June 16, 2016) (statement of Sen.
McConnell).
165 See Burgess Everett & Seung Min Kim, Senate Strikes Deal to Vote on
Doomed Gun Proposals, POLITICO (June 16, 2016), http://www.politico.com/
story/2016/06/senate-vote-gun-restrictions-224426 [https://perma.cc/Z3VE-
T4H4]; Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate Rejects 4 Measures to Control Gun Sales, N.Y.
TIMES (June 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/21/us/politics/
gun-vote-senate.html [https://perma.cc/8BC4-4TKU].
166 Office of Sen. Susan Collins, Terrorist Firearms Prevention Act of 2016
(June 22, 2016), https://www.collins.senate.gov/sites/default/files/Terrorist%
20Firearms%20Prevention%20(Updated%206.22.16).pdf [https://perma.cc/K9
T4-3XD8] (emphasis omitted).
167 INSPECTOR GEN., ROLE OF THE NO FLY, supra note 104, at 9; see supra sub- R
part I.B.
168 See David M. Herszenhorn, Spurred by Orlando Shooting, G.O.P. Senator
Offers a Gun Control Compromise, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/us/politics/gun-control-mass-shootings-orlan
do-susan-collins.html [https://perma.cc/8LJX-Z9X9]; David M. Herszenhorn,
Gun Control Effort in Congress Isn’t Dead, but Prospects Aren’t Good, N.Y. TIMES
(June 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/25/us/politics/susan-col
lins-gun-control-sit-in.html [https://perma.cc/RH95-YHQV].
169 Herszenhorn, Gun Control Effort in Congress Isn’t Dead, but Prospects
Aren’t Good, supra note 168. R
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database of TSDB logically makes sense and seems to be mov-
ing in the right direction for compromise.  Nevertheless, the
watchlist system unfolds so much in the shadows that Con-
gress would be wary to find public support for a plan that
would raise due process concerns and possibly restrict an indi-
vidual’s Second Amendment rights.  The “terror gap” is ulti-
mately a question about terrorists getting guns—a national
security issue.  It is not a question about guns getting into the
hands of terrorists—a gun control versus gun rights issue.  Un-
til Congress understands and addresses the difference, a statu-
tory fix to the “terror gap” is impossible.
III
NEW PROPOSAL: CLOSING THE “TERROR GAP” USING A MODERNIZED
WATCHLIST SYSTEM AND A “STICKS AND CARROTS” APPROACH TO
COUNTERTERRORISM ON THE STATE AND LOCAL LEVEL
The nature of the terrorist threat against the United States
has drastically changed since September 11, 2001, and the
immediate years after the passing of the PATRIOT Act.170  The
danger of HVEs operating within the United States as lone
offenders poses an enormous strain on counterterrorism ef-
forts, and FTOs such as al-Qaeda and ISIL show no signs of
slowing down in their efforts to radicalize Westerners.  Despite
the changing terrorist threat environment, the terrorist watch-
list system and its surrounding policies have remained remark-
ably unchanged.171  How many Omar Mateens is it going to
take for public outrage to break the partisan divide in Con-
gress?  Apparently quite a few.  Within the first week of 2017
alone, alleged ISIL supporter Esteban Santiago killed five peo-
ple at the Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood International Airport
with his own firearm, despite having gone to the FBI several
months before claiming that he had been forced to watch
jihadist propaganda.172  With a direct statutory fix to the “ter-
ror gap” out of the question, this Note proposes indirectly clos-
ing the “terror gap” through a modernization of the watchlist
system and a reliance on state and local authorities to create a
system of incentives to prevent legitimate known or suspected
terrorists from acquiring firearms.
170 See supra section I.A.3.
171 See supra Part II.
172 Paula McMahon, Airport Shooter Esteban Santiago Said He Visited ‘Jihadi
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A. Modernization of the U.S. Terrorist Watchlist System
Considering the Growing Threat from HVEs in the
United States
The purpose of this Note is not to suggest overhauling the
entire watchlist system but for the U.S. government to reevalu-
ate the interaction between TSDB and NICS in order to mod-
ernize TSC.  The KST File should not be the primary terrorism
database used to run NICS.173  The KST File, originally VGTOF,
was created as a hybrid crime database and not a terrorist
database.  Although information is technically fed to the KST
File downstream from TSDB, TSDB and the KST File are essen-
tially the same database.  To qualify for entry on TSDB, all
nominations must satisfy the “reasonable suspicion watchlist-
ing standard” that determines whether an individual is to be
considered a known or suspected terrorist for inclusion in the
KST File; a nomination is not going to survive entry into TSDB
without entry into the KST File.  Therefore, using the “down-
stream” KST File, which is more prone to inaccuracies and
either over-inclusion or under-inclusion compared to TSDB, for
NICS does not logically follow.  The FBI is relying on what was
originally a hybrid crime database, restructured as a terrorist
subdatabase, that is a watered-down version of a main terrorist
database in order to conduct its primary counterterrorism
checks in the realm of gun purchasing.  The government must
reevaluate the subdatabases within TSDB to create a system
that is specifically designed for NICS.
Running NICS against a consolidated system of sub-
databases with a higher standard of review would provide com-
patibility with NICS while easing the tensions within TSDB
associated with overlapping subdatabases.  I suggest consoli-
dating the No Fly List, Selectee List, and Extended Selectee List
into a single subdatabase with a single standard of review rest-
ing on the No Fly List’s “minimum substantive derogatory crite-
ria requirements.”174  Different from the proposed
congressional amendments in 2016, this system would avoid
the issue of Attorney General discretion and instead use the
existing standard of review from the watchlist system as the
trigger for a positive NICS hit and a more thorough investiga-
tion prior to firearm transfer.175  If an individual meets this
higher standard of review for inclusion in the consolidated sub-
database, then the individual should meet a higher standard of
173 See supra subpart I.B.
174 See supra section I.B.2.
175 See supra Part II.
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review to purchase a weapon—a principle on which both
Republicans and Democrats should agree.  Yet this would re-
quire a well-maintained and regulated consolidated sub-
database system, one that is more transparent and less
secretive than how the government currently administers the
No Fly List (and TSDB in general).  Congress would also have to
agree on what an appropriate elevated NICS investigation
would entail, but the current system of a three-day review pe-
riod seems to remain acceptable given that a positive NICS hit
would theoretically increase the statistics on NICS denials to
include less “approvals” for individuals who are added ac-
cidently or whose status cannot be determined and more “deni-
als” for actual known and suspected terrorists.176
Additionally, if an individual who appears on the consoli-
dated subdatabase is ultimately cleared to purchase a weapon,
then there should be a mandatory flagging of the record for a
definite period of time.  Many of the problems with HVEs arise
from their ability to travel from shop to shop and pick up a
considerable number of weapons over a short period without
arousing suspicion.177  Creating a flagging system in the con-
solidated subdatabase would specifically target counterterror-
ism efforts against HVEs who might be approved for a weapon
following an incomplete determination after NICS but still
could pose a threat to national security.  Although the flagging
could raise due process concerns related to creating a list of
individuals, the flagging would be eliminated after a definite
period,178 and the standard of review would be transparent.
Additionally, flagging records would also help U.S. officials
eliminate improperly added records.  Allowing a flagged person
to purchase a weapon does not always mean that they were
incorrectly added to the database to begin with, it just means
that they have surpassed the standard of review necessary to
acquire the firearm.  During the investigation following a posi-
tive NICS hit, U.S. officials would be able to acquire additional
intelligence and make the decision whether the individual was
176 See supra subpart I.C.
177 See, e.g., John Cassidy, Gun Laws and Terrorism: An American Nightmare,
NEW YORKER (June 13, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/
gun-laws-and-terrorism-an-american-nightmare [https://perma.cc/363H-X843]
(“[T]hey had stockpiled a small armory . . . . They had purchased the handguns
themselves . . . at a gun store . . . .”).
178 A definite period of ninety days would conform with current state law and
NICS requirements under ATF Form 4473 regarding applicants without a “final
determination,” including FFL records compliance and the NICS investigation
window. See supra subpart I.C.
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improperly added or whether they should remain on the list
with the flagged status.
B. Creating a System of “Sticks and Carrots” on the State
and Local Level
In order to target HVEs wishing to purchase a weapon who
either appear within TSDB but do not meet the standard of
review to be on the consolidated subdatabase or who do not
meet the standard of review for even TSDB, utilizing a “sticks
and carrots” approach on the state and local level would pro-
vide the necessary incentives and disincentives to make the
“terror gap” obsolete.  State and local governments can use
their own homeland security and gun regulations to construct
an incentive and deterrent system.  For example, Massachu-
setts began Operation Ceasefire in Boston during the 1990s,
which created a “sticks and carrots” system to combat intercity
gun violence amongst youths.179  Relatively successful, I be-
lieve that a counterterrorism “sticks and carrots” approach
targeting HVEs wishing to purchase firearms could follow a
similar model.180  Incentives, or “carrots,” should include pro-
moting education and employment, providing mentorship pro-
grams within at-risk communities, creating awareness in
communities of the warning signs associated with radicaliza-
tion, and reassuring FFLs that alerting the FBI to suspicious
customers will be taken seriously.  Potential deterrents, or
“sticks,” should include creating stronger penalties for families
who do not report children or relatives who are affiliated with
an FTO or have clear signs of radicalization, raising awareness
of the potential implications of providing “material support” to
disincentivize individuals from buying guns for others who are
planning a terrorist attack, and operating under a zero-toler-
ance policy for the abuse or misuse of NICS.
CONCLUSION
Finding a solution to close the “terror gap” cannot be a
temporary or “second-best” fix—it must seal shut the loophole.
Although a statutory fix will seal the gap directly, this solution
179 NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE: THE
BOSTON GUN PROJECT’S OPERATION CEASEFIRE 1 (2001).  Operation Ceasefire’s incen-
tive program is particularly useful given its target audience was juveniles and
young adults, which generally corresponds to the age range most vulnerable to
radicalization. See HOMELAND SEC. COMM., supra note 74, at 4; supra section I.A.3. R
180 Giampaolo Garzarelli, Book Review, 19 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 337, 337–40
(2006) (reviewing BRUNO S. FREY, DEALING WITH TERORRISM—STICK OR CARROT? (Ed-
ward Elgar ed., 2004)).
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is futile in light of the current political situation, the nature of
the Second Amendment, and the lack of interaction between
current firearms regulations and national security law.  In-
stead, indirectly closing the gap through a modernization of the
watchlist system along with a deterrent and incentive system
on the state level would provide a solution to the theoretical
question posed by the “terror gap”: it would prevent those dan-
gerous enough to not fly on a plane from being legally able to
purchase a firearm.  It would also allow for a more regulated
and modernized counterterrorism approach against HVEs and
lone offenders, while not impeding due process rights.  Under
this system, individuals like Omar Mateen, who fall through
the cracks of the watchlist system, would perhaps be caught
prior to killing innocent people.  Although terrorists will inevi-
tably find another loophole in which to operate, closing the
“terror gap” is a positive step toward reducing the threat of
terrorism in the United States while preserving an individual’s
right to bear arms.
